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ABSTRACT 
This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature. The 
first is the development of a theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit 
trading may be analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. The second 
is a numerical analysis of the model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to 
progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as 
well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively 
more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium 
allocations of sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate 
output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero. 
However, the (implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually 
reaching zero itself. This type of result demonstrates the importance of incorporating into 
empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying 
market structure. 
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Carbon Sequestration and Permit Trading on the Competitive Fringe 
Abstract 
This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature. The first is the 
development of a theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit trading 
may be analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. The second is a 
numerical analysis of the model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to 
progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as 
well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively 
more low-cost r~lative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium 
allocations of sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate 
output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero. 
However, the (implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually 
reaching zero itself. This type of result demonstrates the importance of incorporating into 
empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying 
market structure. 
1. Introd uction 
The main focus of carbon sequestration research has thus far been the empirical 
estimation of supply functions, both for specific countries and globally. I Although the 
I 
supply estimates themselves vary, the general opinion emerging from this literature is 
that scope exists for cost-effective policies fostering both the curtailment of deforestation 
and promotion of reforestation in support of carbon sequestration at national, regional, 
and international levels. What has not yet been considered in this analysis, however, is 
the role that market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of an 
equilibrium sequestration allocation and associated carbon price. This paper is a first 
attempt at chara~terizing the role of market structure in the context of a carbon 
sequestration model that also incorporates permit trading, and is thus in keeping with 
multi-instrument approaches promulgated in international agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998). 
A similar issue was faced roughly 20 years ago with respect to permit trading, when 
Hahn's (1984) seminal article demonstrated the importance of market power in 
determining an equilibrium outcome. Hahn's principle result was that if a single firm 
with market power purchases( sells) permits in an otherwise competitive market it will 
behave as a monopsonist(monopolist). Thus, the degree of market inefficiency is 
systematically related to the initial distribution of the permits. Since then, research has 
attempted to quantify the extent to which monopoly and monopsony power influence the 
I With respect to country-specific studies, see Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006) for the US, Xu 
(1995) for China, Fearnside (1995) for Brazil, Ravindranath and Somashekhar (1995) for India, de long, et 
al. (2000) for Mexico, and Sedjo (1999) for Argentina. See Benitez, et al. (2007) and Sohngen and Sedjo 
(2004) for estimates of global supply. 
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permit-trading equilibrium, most notably in the field of experimental economics using 
auction-type environments.2 
Contrary to these earlier works, which assume the existence of monopoly and 
monopsony power, we develop a competitive fringe model that reflects the most likely 
structure that will emerge in a global market (or series of regional markets) for carbon 
sequestration in the presence of permit trading. Our presumption that a competitive fringe 
will emerge in the sequestration market is premised on two strands of the sequestration 
literature. The first strand is empirical, the second theoretical. 
With respect to the empirical literature, Benitez, et al. (2007) estimate global 
sequestration supply curves for afforestation and reforestation activities based on highly 
disaggregated (grid-level) physical data with country-level controls for political, 
financial, and economic risks. They find that low-cost sequestration sites are mainly 
located in regions of the developing world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern 
Brazil, and Southeast Asia. 3 This suggests inter alia that national-level findings, most 
notably those ofStavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006), must be tempered by the fact 
that domestic sequestration policies are likely to co-exist, be supplemented by, or be pre-
empted by international or regional agreements to combat climate change. As a result of 
comparative advantages, such as those identified by Benitez, et al. (2007), the 
equilibrium that emerges in a regional or global sequestration may be governed more by 
the interplay of a dominant firm (or nation or region) and a competitive fringe than by 
perfect competition within a given nation. 
2 See Muller, et al. (2002) and Godby (2000) for examples of this strand ofthe experimental literature. 
3 Sohngen and Sedjo's (2004) numerical analysis of global sequestration potential is not as sanguine about 
the extent of these regional comparative advantages. 
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It is of course possible that on a global scale the market for sequestration could 
resemble more an oligopoly than a competitive fringe. However, as Asheim, et al. (2006) 
point out, there are fairly general conditions under which multiple regional agreements 
I 
(that internalize global externalities such as climate change) outperform a single global 
agreement. In particular, the authors find that a regime with two agreements can Pareto 
dominate a regime based on a single global treaty, implying that regional cooperation 
might be a good alternative - or supplement - to a global environmental agreement. In a 
world governed by such regional agreements oligopolies are less likely to form. 
Consider, for example, a regional agreement between the US and Brazil. Brazil, for 
its part, could p~tentially act as a dominant firm due to its relatively low marginal costs 
of sequestration (associated with existing reforestation opportunities on vast tracts of 
public land (Benitez, et aI., 2007)). US farmers would in turn act as a competitive fringe 
due to their relatively high marginal costs of sequestration (associated with existing 
opportunity costs for alternative private land uses (Lubowski, et aI., 2006)). International 
trading in sequestered carbon would complement an existing domestic permit-trading 
market in the US that includes the nation's largest industrial polluters. 
In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical framework of a competitive 
sequestration fringe in conjunction with a permit trading market (for abatement by 
polluters). We then demonstrate through numerical analysis the responsiveness of 
equilibrium sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative cost structures of the 
three agents included in the model - a dominant sequestration firm, competitive fringe 
firms, and polluters·who participate in a permit trading market. We find that when the 
cost-structure changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the 
4 
competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between the polluters themselves), and the 
dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe 
and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of sequestration and abatement align wi!h a 
higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly 
and asymptotically toward zero. However, the (implied) number of fringe firms 
fluctuates up and down, eventually reaching zero itself. 
We begin our analysis in Section 2 with a simple graphical exposition of the 
competitive fringe model in the presence of permit trading. Section 3 provides a more 
rigorous mathematical framework and presents a simple numerical model, which is then 
solved for an ini,tial set of parameter values and for subsequent changes in the relative 
cost structures embodied by these parameters. The results of the numerical analysis are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. A Simple Graphical Analysis 
This section presents a simple graphical analysis of sequestration and permit trading in 
the context of a competitive fringe model. As a point of departure, consider the standard 
textbook model of the competitive fringe depicted in Figure 1.4 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In this figure, residual demand for the dominant firm's output, IJ, is the horizontal 
difference between market demand, D, and the aggregate supply of the ( competitive) 
fringe firms, sf = Me! (the kink in IJ occurs precisely at the vertical intercept of sf). The 
dominant firm maXImizes profit at point d, by setting a price of p * and selling q: units 
4 This particular model is adopted from Carlton and Perloff (2004). 
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(where MK intersects Mer). The competitive fringe therefore producesq; at point/and 
market equilibrium occurs at point e, with price p* and total quantity Q* = q; + q; . 
Incorporating permit trading into this model (for ease of exposition only two polluters 
cum traders are needed) adds corresponding kinks to the dominant firm's residual 
demand curve. The model is depicted in Figure 2. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
In Figure 2, the Dr curve has kinks at prices pf(the vertical intercept of the 
competitive fringe's aggregate supply curve S) and PI (the vertical intercept of polluter 
pi's permit supply curve ~l). Here, the dominant firm maximizes profit at point e by 
setting a price of p * and selling q; units of sequestered carbon. The competitive fringe 
therefore produces q; of sequestration at point d and polluter p 1 offers q;l abatement 
credits for sale at point/(via abatement beyond its statutorily required amount). Because 
the equilibrium price p * lies beneath the vertical intercept of its permit supply curve, 
polluter p2 chooses not to supply a positive amount of abatement credits to the market. 5 
Market equilibrium occurs at point g, with price p * and total quantity sequestered 
Figure 2 brings to light a complication in the sequestration/permit trading model that 
is absent from the basic model depicted in Figure 1. In Figure 1, closure (via equating 
market demand and supply) is not really an issue. This is because the demand and supply 
5 Note that the vertical intercept of Dr occurs at price Pb which in tum is the vertical intercept of polluter 
p2's permit supply curve ::/2. The coincidence of these two vertical intercepts is consistent with the fact that 
for carbon prices above P2 polluter p2 also becomes a net supplier of abatement credits. With both 
polluters pi and p2 now being net suppliers, market demand for sequestration is effectively negative, i.e., 
for prices above P2 the U curve extends into the second quadrant of the Cartesian coordinate system. 
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sides of the market are separate, i.e., those demanding the good are not also supplying it, 
and vice versa. This is not the case in the sequestration/permit trading model. 
Recall from Figure 2 that polluter pi is a net supplier of abatement credits, and b~th 
the competitive fringe and dominant firm are also suppliers of credits (in the form of 
sequestration). Because it is explicitly included in the model, polluter p2 must therefore 
consume the total amount of credits produced for sale, Q*. This explains the positioning 
of polluter p2's permit supply curve. The equilibrium price p* is consistent with polluter 
p2 effectively supplying a negative amount of abatement credits for sale (i.e., demanding 
a positive number of credits). In specific, polluter p2's demand for credits must equal the 
total amount of ~redits offered for sale by the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and 
polluter pi, i.e., Q*. 
To provide a more rigorous assessment of the competitive fringe/permit trading 
model, in particular with respect to its comparative static properties, we now turn to 
theoretical and numerical analyses based on a full accounting of the model's components. 
In particular, we explicitly close the model with a market-clearing condition that is 
premised on statutorily required abatement levels for each polluter. 
3. Theoretical and Numerical Models 
As indicated in Section 2, the competitive fringe model of carbon sequestration and 
permit trading has three different types of agents/industries: (i) a dominant firm, (ii) a 
permit-trading market comprised of polluting firms, and (iii) a competitive fringe. We 
begin this section with a general analytical treatment of sequestration and permit trading, 
which then guides the development of a simple numerical model to assess the 
7 
responsiveness of sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative cost structures of 
the three agents/industries. 
To begin, the dominant firm chooses its quantity of carbon sequestration, qd, to s~lve 
the profit-maximization problem,6 
Max qd 1r d = P ( q d ' q; , q ~ ) q d - Cd ( q d ) - Fd 
where p is the per-unit price of sequestered carbon (also, in equilibrium, the price of a 
carbon permit), q; is the vector (q;1 , .... , q;1 ) of (profit-maximized) net supplies of 
abatement credits produced by the i = 1, .... ,1 polluting firms participating in the permit 
> 
market (q;i -fJ for all i), q~ = I . q~ is the total (profit-maximized) supply of 
< ) 
sequestered carbon produced by the} = 1, .... ,J competitive fringe firms ( q ~ 2 0 for all}), 
Cd is the dominant firm's sequestration (total) cost function (C~ > 0, c; > 0), and Fd is a 
one-time licensing fee verifying the transferability of the dominant firm's sequestered 
carbon. 7 Further, Pq ,p . ,and P • are each assumed negative. 
8 
d qp qJ 
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition for this problem is, 
which results in the dominant firm ' s implicit supply of carbon sequestration, 
(1) 
6 Variables preceding the parentheses are functions of the variables included within the parentheses. The / 
and II superscripts represent the first and second partial derivatives, respectively, of the sole variable 
included in the functiop., and a subscripted variable indicates a partial derivative with respect to the variable 
in the subscript. 
7 We assume a long-run equilibrium is established in the model. Accordingly, fixed costs of sequestration 
and abatement do not exist. The one-time licensing fee, Fd, is therefore assumed independent of the 
dominant firm ' s scale. 
S As a result of these curvature conditions on Cd and p , the dominant firm ' s problem is concave. 
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and, for future reference, partially determines the equilibrium price of sequestered 
carbon,p*. 
In the permit trading market, polluter i chooses its quantity of abatement, q ., to solve pi , 
the following cost minimization problem, 
where Cpi is polluter i's abatement cost function (C~i > O,C;i > 0), ?fpi is polluter i's 
statutorily required abatement level, and Qp = Li?fPi .9 Note that polluter itakesp* as 
given in this problem. 
The Kuhn,: Tucker optimality conditions for this problem are, 
which result in the polluters' implicit abatement functions, 
and implicitly defines the corresponding net abatement supply functions, 
* ( * - ) ~. - . 1 I qpi = qpi P ,qpi = qpi -qpi' 1 = J •••• J. 
Polluters with q;i > 0 ( q;i < 0) are net suppliers (buyers) of abatement. For future 
> 
reference, let Q; = Li q;i - 0 refer to aggregate net abatement supply. 
< 
With respect to the competitive fringe, firm j chooses its quantity of carbon 
sequestration, fJJJ, to solve the profit-maximization problem, 
(2) 
9 The curvature conditions on Cpi ensure that the polluting firm's problem is concave. Note that this 
problem can equivalently be expressed in terms ofthe polluting firm's choice of emissions rather than 
abatement level. We have chosen the latter merely for expositional and numerical modeling convenience. 
Also for convenience, we assume that verifying the transferability ofthe polluters' abatement is costless. 
9 
Maxqjj Jl"jj = p * qjj - c jj (qjj ) - Fjj' } = l , ... . ,J 
where Cjj is fringe firmj's sequestration cost function (c~ > 0, c~ > 0), and (similar to the 
dominant firm) Fjj is a one-time licensing fee verifying the transferability of fringe firm 
j's sequestered carbon .. lD As in polluter i's cost minimization problem, fringe firm} takes 
p as gIven. 
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for this problem are, 
C~()2 p *,} = l , .... ,J 
which result in the fringe firms' implicit sequestration supply functions, 
q~j =qjj(p*)20,}=l, .... ,J. (3) 
In long-run equilibrium the zero-profit condition for fringe firms}, Jl"~ = 0, detennines 
the number of firms in the fringe, 
n ~ = n f (p * ,Ff ) 2 ° 
where Ff = (F1, .... ,FJ) is the vector of fringe firms ' licensing fees. 
Finally, a market clearing condition closes the model, 
Qp ~ q~ +q; +Q; = Q*. 
(4) 
(5) 
Equation (5) states that aggregate sequestration from the dominant firm and the fringe 
firms, q; + q ~ , coupled with aggregate abatement from the polluting firms, Q; , must be 
no less than aggregate statutorily required abatement, Q p • Equations (1) - (5) form a 
system of I + J + 3 equations that can be used to solve for the I + J + 3 equilibrium 
)0 The curvature conditions on Cjj ensure that the fringe firm 's problem is concave. 
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variables (p* , q;, n~· , q~, q;i ) ' i = 1, .. .. ,1 and) = 1, ... . ,J. In addition, a corresponding 
profit level for the dominant firm, Jr; ~ 0 , can be calculated. 
For the numerical analysis of this model we first assume, as in Section 2, the 
existence of two polluters,p1 andp2, and an endogenously determined number of 
competitive fringe firms, which in tum determine an aggregate fringe supply. 11 For 
simplicity, we use the zero-profit condition to implicitly determine the number of fringe 
firms in long-run equilibrium. This is accomplished by first aggregating the firms ' 
marginal costs into an industry-level equivalent and then using the industry-level zero-
profit condition to endogenize Ff = I . Fjj • As a result, the zero-profit condition holds at _ } 
the industry level and Ff serves as an implicit proxy for the actual number of fringe firms 
in long-run equilibrium, i.e., a larger value of Ff implies a largern~ , all else equal. Also 
for simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that Fd = vFj, where v>O is a 
proportionality factor, i.e., the dominant firm's licensing fee is proportionate to the 
competitive fringe ' s. 
Cost functions for the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and the polluters are 
each assumed quadratic. 12 Specifically, 
II The numerical simulations are performed using GAMS, version 2.0.13. 
12 This functional form is consistent with both Lubowski, et al. (2006) and Benitez, et al. (2007). 
Lubowski, et al. (2006) estimate a logistic aggregate supply (marginal cost) function , to which the linear 
marginal cost function of the quadratic specification provides a fairly close approximation. Our linear 
marginal cost function also approximates quite closely the quadratic function estimated in Benitez, et al. 
(2007) over the majority of the range of carbon sequestration considered in that study. 
11 
where cost parameters ad, afi api, and jJpi and output elasticities cd and C! are each greater 
than zero, i = 1,2 (the remaining variables were previously defined above). It is 
important to note that api is not the vertical intercept of polluter i' s abatement-credit 
supply curve, e.g., it is not equal to Pi (from McP i = ~i, i = 1,2) in Figure 2. The vertical 
intercept for credit supply is instead api + 20jJpi, which is the first partial of Cpi evaluated 
at iiPi = "ifpi = 10 (i.e., where qpi equals zero), i = 1,2. 
Initial values for each parameter in the model are presented in Table 1. Note that 
these values distinguish polluter p2 as being high-cost (in terms of marginal abatement 
cost) relative to polluter pl. Polluter p2 is also high-cost relative to the dominant firm and 
the competitive fringe. However, the slope ofpolluterpl's marginal cost curve (2jJp] = 
0.5) is less than the corresponding slope of the competitive fringe's aggregate marginal 
cost (2/ t:J = 2), while its vertical intercept (ap ] =0.015) is slightly larger (a! = 0.01). 
Both the competitive fringe and polluter pl are high-cost relative to the dominant firm. 
These relative costs reflect the underlying maintained assumptions of the competitive 
fringe model, in particular that the dominant firm generally faces lower sequestration 
costs than the competitive fringe and the polluters, and the competitive fringe in turn 
faces lower cost than at least some of the polluters. 13 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Since the demand curve facing the dominant firm has a total of three kink points 
(including the vertical intercept), one each corresponding to the vertical intercepts of the 
13 In order to focus attention on the role of divergent abatement cost structures, we assume equivalent 
required abatement levels for the polluters, i.e., q pI = q p2 = 10. 
12 
marginal sequestration/abatement-credit cost curves for the competitive fringe, a;; and the 
two polluters, api + 20/Jpi, i = 1,2, we run three separate constrained versions of the 
model: (i) p * ~ a;; (ii) af < p * ~ ap] + 20/Jp], and (iii) ap] + 20/Jp] < P * < ap2 + 20/Jp2, 
(reference the residual demand curve If in Figure 2). The version of the model 
associated with the highest profit for the dominant firm then represents the equilibrium 
solution. In the case of this particular numerical analysis, model version (iii) is 
associated with the dominant firm's highest profit level. This is the region of residual 
demand where the carbon price is least restricted on the upside. 
To assess the responsiveness of sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative 
cost structures of the three agents/industries, we introduce step increases (up to 10 
separate steps) in the slope parameters of the two polluters, /Jp] and /Jp2, and step 
decreases (of the same magnitude) in the elasticity parameter of the competitive fringe, Cf. 
The step increases( decreases),,u, are each of the same magnitude, ,ll=0.l (-O.l) Thus, for 
example, in the first step cfdecreases from one to 0.9, /Jp] increases from 0.25 to 0.35, and 
/Jp2 increases from two to 2.1. In the second step qdecreases from 0.9 to 0.8, /Jp] 
increases from 0.35 to 0.45, and /Jp2 increases from 2.1 to 2.2, and so on. These steps lead 
to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters, 
as well as between polluters pJ and p2 themselves. In particular, polluter p2 becomes 
proportionately less high-cost relative to polluter pJ, and both polluters become 
proportionately less high-cost relative to the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe 
and the polluters in tum become progressively more high-cost relative to the dominant 
firm (in terms of the rate of change in marginal sequestration cost). 
13 
4. Numerical Results 
Table 2 presents our numerical results based on the initial parameter values containe~ in 
Table 1. The second column in the table presents the benchmark equilibrium for the case 
of perfect competition, where the dominant firm does not exist and the market is 
therefore supplied solely by the competitive fringe (and any abatement credits 
contributed by the two polluters). 14 The table's third column presents results for the 
competitive fringe model (i.e., with the dominant firm included). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
We begin by noting that at these initial parameter values the competitive fringe 
produces slightly less sequestration in aggregate than the dominant firm, 
i.e., q; = 3.441> q; = 3.014. At the equilibrium price p* = 6.039, polluter pJ supplies a 
positive amount of abatement credits (q;l = 2.048), while polluterp2 demands the sum 
of these credits and the sequestration produced by the dominant firm and competitive 
fringe, i.e., Qp2 -iip2 = Q* = 8.503:::::> q;2 = -8.503. 
As expected, in relation to the competitive benchmark equilibrium the competitive 
fringe's supply of sequestration, as well as both polluters' abatement efforts, all decrease 
in response to the presence of a dominant firm. The equilibrium carbon price also 
decreases, due to the combination of the dominant firm's lower costs of sequestration and 
the restriction of the market demand curve (see Figure 2). The decrease in the 
14 The conception of perfect competition in the competitive fringe model is markedly different than in a 
monopoly model. In a monopoly model, the monopolist's marginal cost curve corresponds to (or is 
subsumed by) the industry's marginal cost under perfect competition. As a result of this difference, the 
equilibrium carbon price in the competitive fringe model can be higher than in the perfect competition 
model. 
14 
(endogenized) licensing fee for the competitive fringe, F:* , indicates that the equilibrium 
number of fringe firms decreases in the presence of a dominant firm. 
Figures 3 and 4 show how the initial equilibrium in the competitive fringe model, 
changes as the parameter values /Jp] , /Jp2, Gfare changed. As described in Section 3, these 
changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and 
the polluters, as well as between polluters pi and p2 themselves. Polluter p2 becomes 
proportionately less high-cost relative to polluter pi, and both polluters become 
proportionately less high-cost relative to the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe 
and the polluters in turn become progressively more high-cost relative to the dominant 
firm. 
[INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE] 
In Figure 3 we see that these changes result in both the competitive fringe and low-
cost polluter pi losing market share to the dominant firm. The competitive fringe loses 
market share at an increasing rate up to the sixth step increase in its marginal cost, at 
which point its sequestration supply begins an asymptotic decent toward zero. Polluter 
pi loses market share at a decreasing rate throughout and becomes a net buyer of 
sequestration at the fourth step increase in its marginal abatement cost. These two trends 
position the dominant firm as the sole supplier of sequestration (to both polluters) by the 
10th step increase. 
Concomitant with these changes in relative market shares, Figure 4 shows that the 
dominant firm's profit increases exponentially with the step increases. The carbon price 
rises along with the dominant firm's market share and profit (and the gradual 
disappearance of the competitive fringe). Interestingly, the (implied) number of fringe 
15 
firms rises gradually over the first 5 step increases (approximately the same number of 
steps during which the fringe's (aggregate) market share declines at an increasing rate). 
The number of firms then falls for the next two periods, rises again for the following 
period, and then falls steeply toward zero by the final step. At that point the fringe has 
completely disappeared. 
5. Summary and Discussion 
This paper makes two contribution's to the carbon-sequestration literature; a literature 
which has heretofore been focused on the empirical estimation of sequestration supply 
functions, both for specific countries and globally. The first contribution is to develop a 
theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit trading may be analyzed 
jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. An empirically based motivation for 
developing this framework is provided by Benitez, et al. (2007), who find that low-cost 
sequestration sites are mainly located in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern 
Brazil, and Southeast Asia. This suggests that the equilibrium emerging in a regional or 
global sequestration market may be governed more by the interplay of a dominant firm 
(e.g., public land owned by a specific region or nation) and a competitive fringe (e.g., 
private land owned by u.S. farmers) than by perfect competition within a given nation (as 
assumed by Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006)). 
The second contribution is to numerically analyze the competitive fringe/permit-
trading model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to progressively less 
separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between 
the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost 
16 
relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of 
sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the 
competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero. However, th~ 
(implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually reaching zero itself. 
These results demonstrate the responsiveness of sequestration and abatement allocations 
to changes in the relative cost structures of the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and 
the polluters engaged in permit trading. 
Of course numerical analysis based on ad hoc parameter values and functional forms 
is limited by its inability to inform policy with anything other than a more qualitative 
assessment of-equilibrium allocations in a relative sense, e.g., by answering questions 
such as how 'smooth' might be the disappearance of a competitive fringe as the dominant 
firm becomes more cost-effective in its production of sequestration, or vice-versa? Until 
the parameter values and functional forms themselves are empirically estimated and 
incorporated into the numerical analysis, the numerical model will be limited in its policy 
relevance. 
However, this type of criticism also runs in the opposite direction. Until empirical 
analyses such as Stavins (1999), Lubowski, et al. (2006), and Benitez, et al. (2007) 
account for both the global nature of the carbon sequestration problem and the 
corresponding market structures that are most likely to govern the behavior of the various 
agents involved, estimates of what are inherently endogenous variables (e.g., the 
allocation of sequestration and abatement and the carbon price) will be biased estimates 
of the equilibrium outcomes themselves. Thus, the avenue for future research seems 
clear. 
17 
Demand-side information must be incorporated into supply-side models; information 
that is global in scale (or regional if carbon emissions are to be controlled via a set of 
region-based agreements a la Asheim, et aI., 2006) and reflective of underlying mark~t 
structure. Incorporation of this type of information into national supply-side models, such 
as those of Lubow ski, et al. (2006) and Stavins (1999), will extend supply estimates from 
reflecting what is possible under the parochial assumptions of perfect competition to what 
is a likely in the wider realm of a global equilibrium. The same can be said for global 
supply-side models, such as Benitez, et al.'s (2007). With respect to the role that market 
structure might play in the allocation of sequestration and abatement on a global or 
regional scale; echoes can be heard of Hahn's (1984) seminal article demonstrating the 
importance of market power in detennining an equilibrium outcome. 
18 
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Figure 1. Standard Competitive Fringe Model. 
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Figure 2. Competitive Fringe Model with Permit Trading. 
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Figure 3. Quantities of Sequestration and Abatement Credits. 
10 
, 
8 
--
---6 -
--
--- -- --- -
-
--4 -
---------. 
- - .... 
- -qd 
2 -- --t/) 
" .. - - -CD 
....... .. .. .. - - - - . qf ~ 
- - --~ 
-- - -
- .. - -
.... - . 
E:: 0 
-~ -- - - . qp1 C'a --------------
::::::I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- - . qp2 a -2 
--Q 
-4 
-6 
-------
- -- -
------
-8 - - - ---
.:-- - - --
-10 
Step Change in Relative Cost Structures 
23 
Figure 4. Carbon Price, Dominant Firm Profit, and Implicit Number of Fringe Firms. 
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Table 1. Initial Parameter Values for Numerical Analysis. 
Parameter Initial Value 
ad 0.009 
af 0.01 
apJ 0.015 
ap2 0.05 
/JpJ 0.25 
/Jp2 2.0 
cd 1.2 
cf 1 
v 1.05 
qpl 10 
qp2 10 
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Table 2. Equilibrium Solutions Based on Initial Parameter Values. 
Variable Perfect Competition Competitive Fringe 
* 3.441 qd 
* 3.640 3.014 qf 
* 4.550 2.048 qpl 
* 
-8.190 -8.503 qp2 
Q* 8.190 8.503 
p 7.290 6.039 
* 2.985 7rd 
F* 13.250 9.087 
s 
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